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EDWYNA HARRIS*

The Evolution of Water Rights in the
Nineteenth Century: The Role of
Climate and Asset Type*
ABSTRACT

Adoption of a hybrid approach to water rights (the California doctrine) in some western states of the United States (U.S.) and Australia creates some doubt as to what factors drive water rights
evolution. To date, commentators have argued climate is the only
variable that affects this progression. However, climate alone cannot
explain why the hybrid approach, persisted in nine of seventeen arid
U.S. states and two Australian colonies. This paper shows that in
addition to climate, the type of asset investment in water intensive
sectors impacts water evolution via the mobility constraint. This
study presents a predictive framework combining climate and asset
type to determine the net effects on water scarcity and determine
when and where riparian and/or appropriative water rights will
evolve. In this article empirical evidence from several countries is
used to verify the predictive capabilities of the framework. The findings indicated that the combination of variables included in the
framework could better explain water rights evolution than climate
alone.
I. INTRODUCTION

Theoretically, scarcity causes the evolution of property rights
along a linear spectrum from open access to private property by its impact on asset values. 1 Specifically, as scarcity rises, asset values increase.
In turn, the benefits of defining and enforcing rights at more margins
start to outweigh the costs. As the asset values increase the returns from
clear property rights also rise, encouraging the move toward private
property. In the context of water rights, studies have found that scarcity
* Edwyna Harris is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics, Monash
University. E-mail: edwyna.harris@monash.edu. Her work focuses on the allocation of
property rights to water and land in nineteenth century Australia and the United States.
Many thanks to Lee Alston, Robert Brooks, Gary MacGee, Mark Kanazawa, Russell Smyth,
Ian Wills, participants at the seminar program for Environment and Society, Institute of
Behavioural Science, University of Colorado, Boulder (November, 2010); the International
Society for New Institutional Economics (June, 2010), and the Australia-Pacific Economic
and Business History Conference (February, 2010) for valuable feedback on earlier drafts.
1. Cf Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. EcoN. REv., May 1967,
at 347, 348.
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is determined by climate. 2 The main climatic factor determining water
scarcity is rainfall. Therefore, by considering climate alone, the expectation is that water rights will evolve to favor either riparian3 or appropriative rights rather than a combination of the two, quite distinct, legal
approaches. For example, because southern Australia and U.S. states
west of the lOOth meridian are arid, water is scarce and theoretically appropriative rights to water should evolve.
However, during the nineteenth century, only a handful of arid
U.S. states (and no Australian states) exclusively applied appropriative
rights to water (the prior appropriation doctrine). 4 The remaining U.S.
states and Australian colonies, although arid, used the hybrid California
doctrine that combined the use of riparian and appropriative rights. 5
Economists and legal historians have extensively analysed the doctrine's
evolution and impacts, particularly in the U.S. 6 However, no studies
have considered why scarcity in many of these locations did not lead to
exclusive reliance on appropriative rights. As a result, the widespread
adoption of this hybrid approach implies factors other than climate must

2. For examples of studies that have found that scarcity is determined by climate, see
Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West,
18 J.L. & EcoN. 163 (1975); Robert G. Dunbar, The Significance of the Colorado Agricultural
Frontier, 34 AGRIC. H!sT. 119 (1960); Gary D. Libecap, The Assignment of Property Rights on the
Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy, 67 J. EcoN.
H!sT. 257 (2007); Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law: The Development of the
California Doctrine, 1850-1911, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1998); T. E. Lauer, The Common Law
Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963); Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen f.
Field and Public Land Law Development in California, 1850-1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth-Century America, 10 LAw & Soc'y REv. 235 (1975-1976); Donald J. Pisani, Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water Law in the Nineteenth Century,
18 W. HIST. Q. 15 (1987).
3. Ripa means the banks of a watercourse that gives rise to the term riparian. Only
those individuals who owned land that came in contact with the water source could acquire riparian rights. See Lauer, supra note 2, at 60.
4. Exclusive adherence to prior appropriation is referred to as the 'Colorado doctrine.' States that apply this approach are: Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Nevada,
Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico.
5. U.S. states that use the California doctrine are Washington, Oregon, California,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Texas. In Australia, New
South Wales (NSW) and Victoria adopted the California doctrine.
6. For examples of the analysis, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common
Law Burdens of Modern Water Law, 57 U. Cow. L. REv. 485 (1985-1986); Kanazawa, supra
note 2; Lauer, supra note 2; Douglas R. Littlefield, Water Rights During the California Gold
Rush: Conflicts over Economic Points of View, 14 W. H!sT. Q. 415 (1983); McCurdy, supra note
2; J. W. Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision Making: A Critique, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 41 (1959);
Harry N. Scheiber & Charles W. McCurdy, Eminent-Domain Law and Western Agriculture,
1849-1900, 49 AGRIC. H!sT. 112 (1975); Pisani, supra note 2; Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL Sroo. 261 (1990).
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influence scarcity in any given context. These factors will counteract
scarcity brought about by an arid climate.
This paper shows that scarcity is affected by climate and asset
type. Considered individually, climate and asset type impact scarcity in
different ways; combined, they provide a more concise explanation of
water rights evolution by allowing us to determine their net effects on
scarcity. This paper proposes a predictive framework that takes into account asset type, and will predict where riparian and appropriative
water rights will be applied. This framework provides a better understanding of water rights evolution. The framework proposed in this article predicts that in arid climates with non-deployable asset investment
appropriative rights will evolve; in arid climates with deployable asset
investment riparian rights will evolve; in climates that are not arid with
non-deployable asset investment riparian rights will be adopted; and the
same outcome will occur in the presence of climate that is rainfall abundant and deployable assets dominate?
Appropriative rights evolved in the presence of an arid climate
with non-deployable asset investment in California and Colorado's gold
mining and irrigation sectors, and the Australian gold mining sector. Riparian rights evolved in the presence of a rainfall abundant climate with
non-deployable asset investment in the Eastern U.S. and England. Riparian rights also evolved where the climate was arid but deployable assets
dominated in the Australian sheep grazing industry. These findings indicate that adding investment type to climate and determining the net effects on scarcity can provide a more complete story of water rights
evolution in different historical contexts.8

7. Deployable assets are those that can be moved between alternative production locations at low cost, for example, livestock. Non-deployable assets cannot be moved between production locations because their physical features make them costly to install and
remove. See Bradford L. Barham, Jean-Paul Chavas & Oliver T. Coomes, Sunk Costs and the

Natural Resource Extraction Sector: Analytical Models and Historical Examples of Hysteresis and
Strategic Behavior in the Americas, 74 LAND EcoN. 429, 430 (1998).
8. To simplify the analysis, supply side issues are ignored, specifically the supply of
common or private property rights. The main analysis focuses on the fact that these rights
are supplied not how this takes place. As a result, there is no distinction made between
common and statutory law in regard to the evolution of water rights. This is because the
aim is to illustrate that asset type plays an important role in water rights evolution that has,
to date, been overlooked. The argument is primarily concerned with showing why this
variable improves current understanding of the process of evolution rather than analyzing
the pathways via which it occurs. Of course, these pathways may affect the timing and
direction of change and that is the subject of a vast literature. For examples of this literature
discussing the affect on timing and direction of change, see Lauer, supra note 2; Anderson &
Hill, supra note 2; McCurdy, supra note 2; Dunbar, supra note 2; Pisani, supra note 2; Kanazawa, supra note 2; Libecap, supra note 2.
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The remainder of this paper is set out as follows: section II outlines the origins of both prior appropriation and riparian rights in the
U.S. and Australia. Section III presents a predictive framework that establishes how aridity and asset type interact to determine the type of
water rights that will be applied in a given setting. Section IV applies the
framework developed in section III to several empirical examples to determine its predictive power. Section V offers some concluding remarks.
II. HISTORY: PRIOR APPROPRIATION AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS

Before outlining the predictive framework and testing this against
the empirical evidence, the context in which prior appropriation and riparian rights evolved in both the U.S. and Australia warrants some
discussion.
A. Prior Appropriation in the United States
Prior appropriation's basic premise was "first in time is first in
right." In other words, water rights adhered to the principle of first possession. Several additional characteristics were also present. Seniority
ruled so that, in the presence of a water shortage, later Qunior) claimants
were required to reduce or cease using water to provide sufficient
volumes for more senior claimants.9 Non-use would lead to forfeiture
and rights could be traded. Over time, the doctrine was refined to require appropriators to put water to beneficial use or lose their right.
The application and subsequent codification of prior appropriation in the U.S. is well known and has undergone extensive examination.10 Initially, miners applied the doctrine to allocate water on the gold
fields during the late 1840s and early 1850s. Both courts and state legislators later endorsed these rights.

9. Using evidence from early Colorado mining codes it has been argued that the idea
of seniority is a misinterpretation of prior appropriation and in fact equity was the main
aim of this water allocation rule. See David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 EcoLOGY L.Q. 3, 10-11 (2005). This issue is
discussed in more detail in section IV.
10. For examples of the examination, see Anderson & Hill, supra note 2; Freyfogal,
supra note 6; Milliman supra note 6; Kanazawa, supra note 2; Lauer, supra note 2; Littlefield,
supra note 6; Libecap, supra note 2; Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of
the Law, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 393 (1995); McCurdy, supra note 2; Pisani, supra note 2; Rose, supra
note 6; Scheiber & McCurdy, supra note 6; Samuel C. Wiel, Public Policy in Western Water
Decisions, 1 CALIF. L. REv. 11 (1912-1913); Samuel C. Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARv.
L. REv. 252 (1936-1937).

Summer 2013]

THE EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS

221

B. Prior Appropriation in Australia

The application and subsequent formalization of prior appropriation in southern Australia has received much less attention. In fact, there
are no studies analyzing the circumstances leading to its application in
Australia despite the strikingly similar conditions under which the doctrine arose. Like the U.S., appropriation in Australia evolved from water
use on the goldfields in the 1850s. Gold Fields Commissioners, who were
appointed to manage and administer gold mining licences, later sanctioned prior appropriation rules. The first recorded use of the doctrine
took place on Victoria's Beechworth Goldfield in 1853.
The doctrine was based on the premise of first possession so first
in time was first in right; and many of the characteristics present in the
U.S. approach were applied in Australia, including seniority rule, forfeiture for non-use, and tradability.U The main divergence apparent in the
evolution of appropriation in these two countries was the mechanism by
which these informal rules were transformed into formal rights. As
noted, in the U.S. this happened primarily via courts. In Australia, it happened via legislationY
Australian colonies relied on legislation to formalize appropriative rights because the courts refused to sanction informal prior appropriation rules for two main reasons. First, it was considered that all
diversions were illegal under gold mining regulations. 13 Second, Mining
Courts found it impossible to deal with the idea of priority water rights
because they believed such rights lacked legal foundation. While giving
evidence at a Royal Commission investigating the administration of the
Victorian goldfields, one judge plainly stated: "It is a thing unknown in
law, a first right, a second right, or a third right, and I did not know how
to deal with them."14 What is surprising about this interpretation by Aus-

11. However, there were a number of important differences in the doctrine's application on Australian goldfields, specifically: volumes claimed under appropriation were limited; and control over return water (referred to as tail water) was prohibited. See generally R.
BROUGH SMYTH, THE GoLD FIELDS AND MINERAL DISTRICTS OF VICTORIA: WITH NOTES ON THE
MODES OF OcCURRENCE OF GOLD AND OTHER METALS AND MINERALS, 397-409 (1869) (disCUSSing the supply of water to the gold fields).
12. See An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to the Gold Fields 1857, 20 VICT. No. 29 (colonial legislation in New South Wales); see also An Act to Amend the Laws relating to the Goldfields 1855, 18 VrcT. No. 37 (colonial legislation in Victoria).
13. See Court Reporter, Beechworth Court of Mines, OvENS AND MuRRAY RIVER ADVERTISER, August 18, 1858 at 2 ("even after the [Gold Field's Act] came into force no water right
would be held with any legal title till the Mining Board had passed Bye-la[w]s").
14. Gold Fields Royal Commission of Inquiry, VICTORIAN PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 10,
at 33 (1862-1863) (on file with author).
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tralian courts is that prior appropriation had its origins in English common law.
C. Prior Appropriation in England

England was governed by the riparian doctrine, which evolved
during the 1700s, but prior appropriation principles applied only to riparian rights owners. This approach to water rights did not have its foundations in court rulings. Rather, it was espoused in legal treatise. 15
Judges later cited these doctrines in their judgments as authoritative
rules. In the late eighteenth century, the eminent legal writer, Blackstone,
stated that rights to flowing water should follow occupancy, or first possession.16 Prior appropriation theory replaced ancient use and natural
flow principles, the previous doctrines used to determine water rights
disputes. 17 The English prior appropriation rule resembled the prior appropriation doctrine subsequently adopted in the U.S. and Australia in
the nineteenth century. Under this rule, rights remain conditional on any
prior rights that exist for a given water source; rights are limited to the
volumes originally utilized; no rights could exist unless water was beneficially used; and non-use would result in forfeiture.
Prior use did not alter who could obtain water rights; it merely
dictated how disputes between group members would be settled. 18 However, in England, prior appropriation was a secondary claim for owners
who had riparian rights by virtue of the fact that they occupied land in
contact with the watercourse. 19 In England, prior appropriation was a
test applied to disputes between owners who had rights under riparian
law, by virtue of the position of their land, and was not a doctrine used
15. Many important aspects of eighteenth century land and water law were developed
by treatise rather than judicial decision. Moreover, judges in leading cases cited Blackstone's treatise as a direct authority on questions of water law. For this reason, it is a justifiable to claim that a treatise laid the foundations for nineteenth century land and water use.
See JosHuA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT CoMMoN LAw 204 (2004).
16. ld.; see also Rose, supra note 6, at 275.
17. See generally GETZLER, supra note 15, at 193-267 (discussing the move from natural
use to appropriative use in the English common law over this period).
18. Under common law when individuals occupy land bordering a river or stream the
boundary of ownership extends to the bed of the river. In this way, individuals own land
ad medium filum aquae (to the 'middle thread'). This gives them rights to use the water
flowing over this land. These rights were the same type of property that existed in wild
animals where title arose "by a man's reclaiming and making them tame by art, industry,
and education; or by so confining them within his immediate power, that they cannot escape and use their natural liberty... [this property] may be destroyed if they resume their
ancient wildness, and are found at large." GETZLER, supra note 15, at 176 (quoting William
Blackstone).
19. See GETZLER, supra note 15, 207-17.
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to determine access (as in the U.S. and Australia). Specifically, the rule
was used to determine what actions would be considered acceptable
given the shared right of all riparians to make use of the resources on
their land. Individuals occupying land that did not come into contact
with the watercourse were unable to obtain water rights and therefore,
they could not appropriate the resource.
As a result, in England water use rights were obtained by a group
of individuals based on their land occupancy. This group of right holders
were permitted to make use of water to the exclusion of all others-a
characteristic typically associated with common property. The appropriation rule assigned each group member a right to the flow of services
from the asset. However, the flow did not have to be equally shared between users; rather, the first user would be entitled to unencumbered use
rights compared with subsequent users. For example, assume a river has
two riparian owners, A and B, and contains 100-megaliters of water. In
period one, A utilizes 50 megaliters for her mill; in period two, B begins
to utilize 60 megaliters for his mill. Applying the appropriation rule, a
court would find A has a prior use right to 50 megaliters and therefore B
can only 'appropriate' the volume not being exploited by A-50
megaliters. 20
D. Riparian Law

Riparian law was and is used in England. As mentioned above,
riparian law was used to determine rights while prior appropriation was
used to resolve disputes between those right holders. By the nineteenth
century, English courts (and those in the eastern states of the U.S.) had
replaced the appropriation rule to resolve disputes between riparian
rights holders with reasonable use. Reasonable use dictated that actions
by water users were reasonable if and only if they did not devalue the
common right held by all water right owners along the watercourse. This
test has influenced modem tenets of riparian law.
In both the U.S. and Australia, riparian law had its origins in English common law. California courts were bound by English common
law after 1850 when the legislature passed "[a]n Act adopting the common law." However, it is unlikely that early legislators recognized that
adoption of English common law meant simultaneously accepting riparian elements and the reasonable use test as the basis for settling disputes.21 Riparian water law was thus adopted in California alongside
20. A court would find that B had infringed on A's right under tort rules of trespass or
negligence. The remedy would be either an injunction or damages.
21. See Wood v. Waud, (1849) 3 Exch. 748, 154 Eng. Rep. 1047 (adopted reasonable use
as English common law); see also Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
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appropriative rights and this combination gave rise to the California doctrine which created complications for courts determining riparian-appropriator conflicts that occurred with increasing frequency from the 1880s.
Australia initially adopted riparian law when they the adopted
British common law in 1828 under the Australian Courts Act.22 Section
24 of this legislation explicitly granted colonial courts the right to diverge
from established precedent by stating that English law applied only
where it was deemed suitable given the conditions of the colony. Australian judges generally considered English law appropriate only where it
furthered the peace, welfare, and good governance of the colony. 23
By virtue of section 24, Australian courts could have refused to
adopt or modify aspects of riparian law if they believed colonial circumstances warranted this deviation. Moreover, courts had deviated from
English common law in other areas suggesting the flexibility granted
under section 24 would be exercised. For example, in Rex v. Farrell, Dingle and Woodward,24 the court found that applying English rules of evidence forbidding convicts from giving testimony was unworkable in a
penal colony.25 Nevertheless, despite the obvious climatic deviations between Australia and England and the relative flexibility given to Australian courts, the reasonable use test was applied to determine riparian
conflicts in the colonies. 26 As a result, common law riparian rights and
reasonable use were applied alongside legislation supporting prior appropriation on the goldfields-thus establishing the use of the California
doctrine in Australia.
The very clear sectoral demarcation of the two water rights systems is unique to Australia. Legislation applied prior appropriation only
(application of reasonable use in the eastern states of the U.S. preceded English courts by at
least four decades); Kanazawa, supra note 2, at 162-65.
22. Australian Courts Act 1828 9 Geo 4 c 83 (UK) (repealed) (adopting common law in
Australia).
23. Edwyna Harris, The Economic Implications of Law: Nineteenth Century Legal Innovation in New South Wales, the Case of the Wool Lien and Stock Mortgage (2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
24. Rex v. Farrell, 1 Legge's Sup. Ct. Cases (1825-1862) 5, 34 (N.S.W. 1831) (published
1896).
25. Individual judges would also exercise flexibility under this rule, particularly when
considering decisions by British courts of coordinate jurisdiction. See generally BRuCE
KERCHER, AN UNRULY CHILD: A HISTORY OF LAW IN AUSTRALIA 82-102 (1995) (discussing the
Australian judicial system and its attachment to England).
26. Riparian rights and the reasonable use test were applied in several cases in NSW
and Victoria during the nineteenth century. In NSW these cases were: Cooper v. Corporation of Sydney (1853) 1 Legge 765 (NSW); Hood v. Corporation of Sydney (1860) 2 Legge
1294 (NSW); Pring v. Marina (1866) 5 NSWSCR (L) 390; Howell v. Prince (1869) 8 NSWSCR
(L) 316; Lomax v. Jarvis (1885) 6 NSWLR (L) 237. In Victoria, one case was Newstead v.
Flannery (1887) 8 ALT 178 (Vic).
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on the gold fields so that no water users outside this sector could assert
or defend claims based on first possession. Riparian rights and reasonable use were applied in all other areas, including the largest sector of the
colonial economies-the pastoral industry. This divergence from theory
can be rationalized using the framework from section three.
III. A FRAMEWORK TO EXPLAIN WATER RIGHTS EVOLUTION
A. Principles That Affect Water Rights Development

Theoretically, scarcity leads property rights to evolve in a linear
spectrum from open access (an absence of property rights) to common
property (limited group property rights) and finally, private property
(individual rights).Z7 Initially open access exists when there is little competition and scarcity is low. Scarcity increases as competition intensifies
through actions such as factor price or technology changes that increase
exploitation. Private property rights will reduce the losses associated
with racing that result in the familiar tragedy of the commons. 28 Initially,
because the group of expropriators is relatively small and homogenous,
common property rules can serve to limit the racing incentive, protect
claims, and support productive investment. The creation of common
property is dependent on organization and exclusion costs. In the first
instance, common property will arise only so long as the group can overcome the public good problem of collective action.Z9 Shared social norms
provide a foundation for such organization, highlighting the importance
of homogeneity in supporting the rise of such regimes. 30 In the presence
of cultural homogeneity where the costs of formal sanctions are highfor example, at the frontier-the supply of common property rights will
rely, in part, on norms. Norms lower coordination costs by creating focal
points that, prior to the play of the game, have mutual significance to
27. Cf Demsetz, supra note 1, 350-53.
28. The tragedy of the commons was first postulated in 1968. The tragedy arises wherever property is used in common and remains open access because this creates an incentive
for individuals acting alone to over use the resource. Overuse is the result of the nonexcludable nature of a common pool resource. Non-excludability means that no one individual can prevent another actor from using the common pool. Thus, competition is characterized by a race, which is accompanied by over capitalization as each resource user tries
to maximize current returns. The outcome is twofold: over use leads profits to fall to zero
while underinvestment in future stocks reduces the long-run rents accruing from exploitation. For a more in depth discussion of the theory of the tragedy of the commons, see generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
29. Thniinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: CoOPERATION, CoNFLICT, AND LAw 73, 84 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred McChesney eds., 2003).
30. Lee J. Alston, Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Mueller, The Development of Property
Rights on Frontiers: Endowments, Norms, and Politics, 72 J. EcoN. HrsT. 741, 746 (2012).
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players based on past experiences. 31 This establishes an equilibrium that
all players expect, which increases the likelihood of cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game. 32 Individual members of a group monitor and enforce norms because it is in their interest to do so.33 This is because there
are greater gains from cooperation than conflict. Internalizing these gains
relies on continuing the behavioral pattern established by shared norms.
Actors will therefore have an explicit incentive to monitor and enforce
norms because any breach is an indirect threat to them and the rental
stream they derive from the collective good. 34 In other words, norms reduce organizational costs faced by a group. Once organization costs are
overcome, exclusion costs are ongoing and require continued investment
by group members to prevent encroachment. However, because each
group member has an incentive to maintain exclusivity in order to maximize rents accruing to them, the marginal costs of defense per member
are lower than in the absence of the common property arrangement. Internal governance costs also exist in these arrangements to prevent overexploitation by limiting free riding and restricting use. It is assumed that
where groups are small, homogenous, and share social norms, the costs
of internal governance will be low. 35
Typically, in common property regimes margins exist in which
rights go undefined because the costs of definition outweigh the benefits.
For example, rights of riparian owners were determined by the reasonable use test that was based on reference to a common right held by all
riparians. An activity by one riparian owner would be deemed reasonable if and only if it did not devalue the common right. Similar imprecision may exist for other resources subject to common property rules,
such as land where use of common pastures dictates only the number of
animals each member can graze rather than their location on the pasture.
By leaving undefined the area on which animals owned by individual
members can graze, there is the potential for conflicts when common
31. See Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. EcoN. HrsT. 114, 120-21 (2001) (defining
focal points as expectations about behavior, including what is fair, and first possession
rules that underpin the formation of property rights). See also RoBERT AxELROD, THE EvoLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT C. ELLIKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBOURS
SETTLE DISPUTES 123-136 (1991); Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, J. EcoN. PERSP., Autumn
1989, at 85, 95-96 (discussing the impact of norms on property rights and coordination
costs).
32. The classic prisoner's dilemma game demonstrates that individuals may choose
sub-optimal strategies when their payoffs are conditional on the behavior of another
individual.
33. ELLIKSON, supra note 31, at 123-136.
34. Sugden, supra note 31, at 96.
35. See Eggertsson, supra note 29, at 84-85.
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pastures are relatively large and have variations in feed quality. The
probability of conflict can be reduced if rules requiring pooling of output
are adopted to ensure returns to each member are equal regardless of
individual animal production. Common property predominantly
prevails when it is too costly to divide the resource stock between individual owners36 because there are net gains from assigning individual
shares in the flow of services from the asset to group members. 37 Common property arrangements can be relatively stable and long lasting
where groups are small, productive technology used by members is unchanged, and the group is able to capture the full benefits associated
with the delineation of rights. 38
B. Incomplete Framework to Explain Water Rights Evolution

Under conditions of increased scarcity, general property principles predict that common property will give way to private property because scarcity creates higher costs of maintaining the former set of rights
compared with the latter. Rising costs of common property enforcement
are brought about by an increasing number of heterogeneous expropriators that lead to rising marginal costs of defense for incumbents.39 Once
defense costs are prohibitively large, the common property system will
collapse.40 For example, consider a case where output prices for the product of a common pasture are rising, thereby increasing the returns from
grazing. New entrants will have an incentive to move into the grazing
sector to capture part of the growing rental stream available, thereby increasing enforcement costs for common property owners. Once defense
costs exceed the benefits of common property,41 economic pressures will
encourage a move to private property. 42
Aside from economic pressures technological change can also reduce the costs of dividing the stock of a commonly owned resource between owners leading to the dismantling of a commons arrangement
36. Lueck, supra note 10, at 405-409.
37. See Eggertsson, supra note 29, at 74.
38. Rose, supra note 6, at 273; see also Lee J. Alston, Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Muel-

ler, De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S.
Frontiers 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15264, 2009).
39. Eggertsson, supra note 29, at 76-77.
40. Id. at 76.

41. This occurs when the marginal costs of preventing encroachment outweigh the
marginal benefits of group membership.
42. The form that private rights take depends on the interaction between norms, politics, and economics. See Alston, Harris & Mueller, supra note 38, at 5. Further, extant common property owners may not have their rights legitimized so that the prevailing private
rights may allocate goods to other actors. Id.
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and adoption of private property. Consider the following example, in the
first period, the cost of dividing the stock is high because the technology
does not exist for low cost enforcement of individual rights. For instance,
during the early settlement of the U.S. Great Plains, the absence of low
priced fencing materials increased the costs of enforcing private rights to
large land claims required for cattle grazingY Returns from enforcing
land rights for a small group of ranchers were high. Ranchers formed
associations with each member having a right to the flow of services
from the land.
In the second period, there was an exogenous technological shock
with the introduction of barbed wire. Barbed wire, a low cost fencing
technology, decreased the costs of enforcing individual rights to the
land. As a result, land owned in common in period one was divided
among ranchers as private property.
Similar to the general property principles, empirical studies analyzing water rights evolution highlight the vital role of scarcity in moving from open access to private rights.44 These studies argue that climate
alone determines scarcity, and therefore the type of water rights that
evolve in a given setting. Climate acts to affect scarcity in the following
ways. If competition exists but remains constant in the short-run and
rainfall is abundant, scarcity is low. In arid climates, scarcity is high.
Therefore, ceteris paribus,45 in rainfall constrained climates water rights
evolution would tend toward private rights, while in rainfall abundant
climates common rights will prevail.46
However, climate alone cannot explain the rise of the California
doctrine where riparian and appropriative law were applied to the same
resource. By considering only the Californian climate, in general it would
be considered arid, therefore exclusive use of prior appropriation should
have evolved. This did not happen and instead a hybrid approach was
adopted. Moreover, the hybrid approach used in California evolved in
other U.S. states and Australia suggesting there must be additional factors that effect the nature of water rights evolution that have not been
identified in the relevant literature.
43. Cf ERNEsT STAPLES OSGOOD, THE DAY OF THE CATTLEMAN 135-49 (1929); R. Taylor
Dennen, Cattlemen's Associations and Property Rights in the American West, 13 ExP.
EcoN. HIST. 423, 423-24 (1976).
44. For examples of studies analyzing water rights, see Freyfogle, supra note 6; Kanazawa, supra note 2; Littlefield, supra note 6; Rose, supra note 6.
45. Ceteris parabis in common economics language means 'all things remaining equal.'
In practice this means that all but one variable in a model remain constant allowing the
analyst to isolate the effects of changes in just one factor on economic outcomes.
46. The timing of these events is ignored, but it is recognized that this evolution may
happen over varying time frames given different contexts.
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C. New Framework to Explain Water Rights Evolution

In order to provide a more comprehensive framework to make
sense of these empirical outcomes, careful re-examination of factors affecting scarcity is critical. It is the contention of this paper that in addition to climate, the type of asset investment in water intensive sectors
affects water scarcity and, therefore, the water rights that evolve in a
given setting. Like climate, asset investment influences scarcity in specific ways. Further, by combining asset investment and climate, it is possible to predict where and when riparian and/ or appropriative rights
will prevail.
If aridity was the main driver of water scarcity in California and
Australia then it would be expected that courts would have abolished
riparian rights in favor of exclusive reliance on prior appropriation as
Colorado had done. 47 The fact that the courts did not act to eliminate
riparian rights is surprising, particularly in the California context, given
the general contention that these courts were particularly innovative and
undertook doctrinal change that reflected climate conditions.48 For example, the California Supreme Court codified informal miners' rules, including prior appropriation, indicating they were willing to adopt rules
suited to the nature of resource use. 49 The fact that no study offers a
framework by which to rationalize the broader application of the California doctrine in arid climates such as Australia indicates a gap in the literature regarding the path of water rights evolution in any given setting.
Asset investment is the key to this new framework because it addresses the gaps in the old framework. Assets are divided into either
deployable or non-deployable assets. Deployable assets such as sheep or
cattle can be moved at little or no cost because they are mobile. Nondeployable assets are unable to be moved from one location to another at
low cost because their physical features make them costly to install, remove, and relocate,50 like a channel to move water to a gold mine.
Putting aside climate, consider the impacts of asset investment on
scarcity. If you assume constant competition in the short-run, asset investment affects scarcity in the following way: where deployable assets
47. See Freyfogle, supra note 6, at 495 (citing Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443
(1882) and Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551 (1872)).
48. See generally Lauer, supra note 2; McCurdy, supra note 2; Pisani, supra note 2;
Schieber & McCurdy, supra note 6; Wiel, supra note 10.
49. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855), was the first case in which the California Supreme Court recognized the right of first possession and diversion. Recognition of first
possession was at the core of the prior appropriation doctrine that was repeatedly upheld
in later cases.
50. Barham, Chavas & Coomes, supra note 7, at 430.
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are the main form of investment, scarcity is low; conversely, where nondeployable asset investment prevails, scarcity is high. The mechanism by
which asset investment influences scarcity is through the mobility constraint. For simplicity, assume the mobility constraint is either zero or
one.51
At zero, an asset is fully mobile; that is, the mobility constraint
does not bind and movement costs are also zero. Conversely, at one the
mobility constraint binds and movement costs are equal to one. If the
mobility constraint is zero in any period, it is not binding and assets are
fully deployable, which increases the availability of alternative productive locations and makes scarcity low. For example, in the face of district
drought, sheep or cattle are not confined to one site. They can be moved
at low costs to alternative production locations where inputs are unaffected. The costs of moving these assets are positively related to the distance travelled, where a greater distance increases relocation costs by
causing the death of smaller animals and a reduction in wool and/ or
meat quality of the flock or herd.52 However, if you assume that distance
travelled is small, movement costs approach zero.53 As a result, the costs
of mobility are not so high as to decrease the returns from movement to
zero.
A further complement to a non-binding mobility constraint for
livestock is the ability to slaughter animals in the face of region or state
wide drought. Drought limits the availability of both feed and water for
existing flocks or herds. Slaughter reduces competition for all inputs. In
other words, marginal adjustments to animal numbers can be made
given the climatic variations experienced over time. Once a drought
breaks, natural increases in numbers can be relied upon to rebuild flocks
or herds to pre-drought levels. Nevertheless, at some point, slaughtering
costs will approach one, such as where flock or herd numbers are reduced to such a point that only key breeding animals remained. At this
point, the cost of slaughtering would be outweighed by the costs of replacing animals, which is the cost of going to market to buy new stock.
As a result, there are diminishing marginal returns to slaughtering
because at some point the costs of continued slaughter will be higher
than the benefits. There may be cases were the mobility constraint is nonbinding, or close to zero, but returns to movement are zero. This would
51. Of course, the mobility constraint may have a value anywhere between zero and
one, reflecting the corresponding costs of relocation.
52. One could easily assume that relocation costs are a function of transportation costs
for instance, the costs of hiring labor and a truck suitable for asset redeployment. However,
this would not alter the outcome of the analysis because transportation costs are also positively related to distance.
53. Costs are positive but at very low levels.
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happen if, for example, relocation causes the death of an entire flock or
herd. Under these conditions, asset mobility is associated with prohibitively high costs so actors will not relocate under any conditions. As a
result, while these assets would be considered deployable in the first instance, deployment costs are approaching or equal to one so in fact nondeployable characteristics dominate. This will increase water scarcity.
When the mobility constraint is equal to one, it is binding and
movement costs are prohibitively high. Under this circumstance, assets
are non-deployable and scarcity is high. To summarize, the effects of asset investment type is, ceteris paribus,S4 when investment in deployable
assets dominates, water rights evolution will tend toward riparian rights;
and, ceteris paribus, when non-deployable asset investment dominates,
water rights evolution will tend toward private rights. By combining climate and asset investment, predictions as to when and where either riparian or appropriative water rights apply can be established (Table 1).
Table 1 illustrates that in arid climates where investment is in
non-deployable assets, scarcity is high, and prior appropriation will be
applied. 55 However, where climate is arid and investment is in deployable assets, scarcity is counteracted by a non-binding mobility constraint
and riparian rights will be used to allocate water supplies. In a non-arid
climate where non-deployable asset investment dominates, a relative
abundance of rainfall will counteract the binding mobility constraint effects on scarcity leading to the adoption of riparian rights. When climate
is not arid with investment in deployable assets, the combination of rainfall abundance and a non-binding mobility constraint will mean low
scarcity prevails and riparian rights will be utilized.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK FACTORS
USING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This section uses empirical evidence to explain the effect of different types of assets on the evolution of water rights in Australia and the
U.S. If the framework proposed in this article is correct, water rights
evolution in each case should conform to the property rights predictions.
The empirical examples presented support expected outcomes that common rights were adopted in the following cases: when aridity was accompanied by deployable assets (Australia), or where rainfall was
54. Ceteris parabis in common economics language means 'all things remaining equal.'
In practice this means that all but one variable in a model remain constant allowing the

analyst to isolate the effects of changes in just one factor on economic outcomes.
55. Literature suggests that reliance on common property arrangements for water in
arid environments may be fleeting or skipped altogether as a result of climate constraints.
See Rose, supra note 6, at 262.
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abundant but asset investment was non-deployable (Eastern U.S. and
England). In the cases where aridity was combined with non-deployable
assets, appropriative rights evolved (Australia and Western U.S.).
A. Climate and Asset Investment Factors Applied in Australia

Before applying the predictive framework from section two, the
new factor of asset investment and its interplay with climate need to be
considered. Australia is arid, with much of New South Wales (NSW) and
Victoria receiving less than 200-300mm (8-12 inches) annually, similar
to the U.S. Great Plains and far west. 56 Australian economic development
in the nineteenth century was underpinned by pastoral sector expansion
and growth of the wool industry. By the 1830s, Australian wool producers were critical suppliers of the British textile industry. By 1865, total
sheep numbers in NSW and Victoria were 16.5 million and by the end of
the century, numbers exceeded 50 million. 57 Pastoralists used water for
two main activities: for washing wool prior to transport to reduce its
weight58 and for sheep to drink. During much of the nineteenth century
pastoralists relied almost exclusively on surface water supplies to maintain sheep flocks. Substantial ground water supplies were available, particularly in NSW, below which lays the Great Artesian Basin. The Great
Artesian Basin is one of the largest groundwater basins in the world.
However, until the 1880s, pastoralists limited their use of groundwater.59
From the 1880s, there was greater investment in locating potable groundwater in order to substitute for highly variable surface water supplies.
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests pastoralist attempting to locate groundwater supplies suffered from uncertainty and high cost.6°

1. Scarcity
NSW and Victorian pastoralists faced relatively high levels of
water scarcity brought about by limited rainfall and an absence of low
56. John Whittington & Peter Liston, Australia's Rivers, in 85 YEAR BooK AusTRALIA
449, 449 (Austl. Bureau of Stat's. ed., 2003).
57. Bruce Davidson, Agriculture, in AusTRALIANS HisTORICAL STATISTICS 70, 81 (Wray
Vamplew ed., 1987).
58. N.G. BUTLIN, INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1861-1900 72
(1964).
59. Butlin, supra note 58 at 79-80; see also James Jervis, The Western Riverina, 38 J. RoYAL
AusTL. HIST. Soc'y 1, 13 (1952); C.J. LLOYD, EITHER DROUGHT oR PLENTY: WATER DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN NEw SoUTH WALES 60-61 (1988). The Great Artesian Basin in
estimated to contain close to 65 billion megaliters of water. QuEENSLAND DEPARTMENT oF
ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, THE GREAT ARTESIAN BASIN (2011) (factsheet),
available at http:/ /www.nrm.qld.gov.au/factsheets/pdf/water/w68.pdf.
60. LLOYD, Id.
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cost surface water substitutes. This was counteracted by a non-binding
mobility constraint in the pastoral industry. Complementing this, pastoralists scattered their land claims over large areas to lower the cost of
district level drought. 61 Given these conditions, using the predictive
framework proposed by this article that takes into account the mobility
of assets, it is expected that riparian rights would have been adopted to
govern water allocation in the pastoral sector during the nineteenth century-and in fact, this did occur.
In the case of wool production, where asset investment was
deployable, the riparian doctrine had several advantages compared with
prior appropriation. Land owners or occupiers that acquired riparian
rights did not lose these rights during periods of non-use. The riparian
doctrine created a right of access rather than a right to a specific quantity
of water, and interpretation as to what constituted reasonable use was
fluid across time and space.62 Retention of water rights during non-use
periods complemented grazing, where the optimal location for profit
maximization was subject to inherent seasonal variation and land claims
were scattered over large areas to include summer and winter properties, providing better drought protection.63 Retaining water rights even
during non-use periods decreased monitoring and enforcement costs of
water access. Further, it conferred on pastoralists the net gains from assigning individual shares to the flow of services from the resource to
group members.
For graziers to take advantage of the non-binding mobility constraint prevailing in livestock investment, one or more of three conditions needed to prevail. First, substantive groundwater had to be
accessible. Second, non-seasonal large rivers had to be available and
third, rainfall had to vary across holdings. As explained, vast groundwater supplies did exist but uncertainty and high cost meant very few
squatters tried to exploit this source. Moreover, Australia's river systems
are typically characterized by low flows and high variability. Geogra-

61. On average pastoralists claimed 34,000 acres in NSW and 24,000 in Victoria. STEPHEN H. ROBERTS, THE SQUATTING AGE IN AUSTRALIA 362 (2d ed. 1964).
62. Non-use of water rights on the gold fields resulted in forfeiture of rights under
clause 40 of the 1861 'Gold Fields Act' regulations. An Act to Amend the laws relating to the
Gold Fields 1861, 25 Viet. No. 4 ("privileges not upheld and used for a period of 14 days in
the case of alluvial mining and for a week in the case of river working shall be held to be
forfeited, unless abandonment can be explained to the satisfaction of the commissioner").
This act noted that non-use during periods of drought could not be grounds for forfeiture.
63. In each district, land claims were enforced by a Crown Lands Commissioner under
the 1836 'Squatting Act' and by the physical presence of employees. An Act to Restrain the
Unauthorised Occupation of Crown Lands 1836, 7 Will. No. 4 (allowing for the appointment of
a Crown Land Commissioner to enforce land claims).
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phers use coefficient variation of annual flow (CVR) to calculate flow
variability in river systems.64 Australia's CVR has been estimated at 1.12
compared with the world average of 0.33. These findings were consistent
across both large and small catchments.65 Assuming this level of variability persisted in the nineteenth century, graziers did not have access to
large non-seasonal rivers. 66 Australian rainfall is both temporally and
spatially variable, therefore rainfall patterns over squatters' holdings
would fluctuate somewhat. Using annual rainfall data to assess whether
empirical evidence supports this expectation, first difference correlations
are estimated between paired rainfall stations.67
To estimate the correlation coefficients, annual rainfall data was
collected from statistical records of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology for the period being considered.68 There are several important points
that need to be highlighted before the statistical analysis is undertaken.
Rainfall data collection began in the mid-1860s, but only for a very limited number of locations; until the mid to late 1870s, many locations
records were incomplete.69 Because months were missing, it was impossible to calculate annual precipitation. Moreover, even from the 1870s,
the number of rainfall stations for which data are available is small com64. Whittington &t Liston, supra note 56, at 449.
65. B.L. Finlayson &t T.A. McMahon, Australia v the World: A Comparative Analysis of
Streamflow Characteristics, in FLUVIAL GEOMORPHOLOGY oF AusTRALIA 17, 22 (Robin F.
Warner ed., 1988).
66. Although widespread, systematic river gauging was not undertaken in Australia
prior to the mid to late twentieth century. There is very little reason to assume this highly
variable pattern of river flows did not persist during the squatting period circa 1830-1880.
Moreover, the effects of such significant variation would have been far more pronounced
than today because extensive construction of artificial storages on river systems were almost non-existent.
67. First difference correlation estimations subtract the value of one observation from
the previous observation and calculate the linear association between two variables that are
assumed to be random. ROGER PORKESS, COLLINS DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 61-62 (2d ed.
2004).
68. Australian Bureau of Meteorology, Climate Data Online, BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY
http:/ /www.bom.gov.au/climate/data/ (last update Aug. 16, 2012) (web-based data calculator for rainfall).
69. The Australian Bureau of Meteorology explains why rainfall records may be incomplete in the following way: "Historically, if a station moved a relatively short distance
(within about 1 to 2 km) it may, but not always, have continued to use the same station
number. Changes may have occurred in instrumentation and/ or observing practices over
the period included in a dataset, which may have an effect on the long-term record. In
recent years many stations have had observers replaced by Automatic Weather Stations,
either completely or at certain times of the day." Australian Bureau of Meteorology, About
Rainfall Data, BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, http:/ /www.bom.gov.au/climate/cdo/about/
about-raln-data.shtml (last update Apr. 28, 2010). This webpage also provides for further
details of the limitations of historical rainfall data.
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pared with today's standards. 70 These data constraints affected the approach to the statistical analysis by limiting the number of observations
that could be included. In total there were 26 stations throughout NSW
and Victoria. These were then divided into 13 pairs. 71 Given the extent of
graziers land holdings during this period, a range of distances in square
kilometres (km2 ) was calculated from historical evidence to determine
appropriate pairings. The lower bound of this range for both NSW and
Victoria was 64km2, which is equivalent to 25m2 and was the limitation
government imposed on individual claims under The Occupation Act
(1861). 72 The upper bound for the two colonies differed based on the average claims size of 138km2 in NSW and 97km2 in Victoria. 73 The aim in
pairing rainfall stations was to match two sites that were within these
distance ranges for each colony74 Appendix 1 shows the average distance between each station pairing was 93 km2 (NSW) and 76 km2
(Victoria). 75
Simple first difference correlation estimations for each station pair
are reported in Table 2 (below). The table indicates that rainfall is highly
correlated between most stations in the sample. Correlation coefficients
below 0.80 are the result of either the direction or distance between the
station pair. For example, for pairs located in an East-West line a lower
correlation indicates they are likely to be located in different average
rainfall belts.
Further, there is an inverse relationship between correlation and
distance for rainfall: the further apart sites are, the lower the correlation
coefficient?6 The correlations shown in Table 2 suggest that on much of
the land occupied by a grazier rainfall was highly correlated so that if
there were a reduction in rainfall, the entire location in which claims
were situated may have been affected. As a result, there would be little
gained from the mobility advantages of sheep grazing and deployable
70. Id.
71. This total was made up of six pairs from NSW and seven from Victoria. The pairings are listed in Appendix 1.
72. An Act for Regulating the Occupation of Crown Lands 1861, 25 Viet. No.2., para 14.
73. Original estimates were recorded in acres. Here, these estimates have been converted to km2 to make the distance between stations and claim size comparable.
74. These distances are 64-138km2 for NSW and 64-97km2 for Victoria.
75. Average annual rainfall totals in Australia predominantly run North-South so that
stations within the same North-South belt would have a greater probability of higher correlation coefficients than those located East-West. See, e.g., YEAR BooK AusTRALIA (Sheridan
Roberts, ed., Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012), available at http://www.abs.gov.au/
ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0-2012-Main%20Features-Australia's%
20climate-143.
76. J. R. Anderson, Rainfall Correlations in the Pastoral Zone of Eastern Australia, 18 Aus.
MET. MAG. 94, 94 (1970).
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assets would lose their explanatory power in the framework. However,
pastoralists treated alternative locations on their holdings as substitutes
rather than complements, so the fact that the correlations estimated are
not one suggests there was a variation across holdings that allowed pastoralists to exploit the rainfall differences over geographically dispersed
plots.
2. Asset Investment
Mobility counteracts scarcity brought about by aridity. Evidence
from Australia's pastoral zone supports this claim so that "[t]he situation
of some establishments in a chain enjoying favourable seasons whilst
others are subject to poor or disastrous seasons ... thus [providesJ the
scope for stock movements between establishments . . :m In addition,
mobility became the mechanism of drought risk management for squatters where they not only fanned sheep over large areas but also routinely
shifted the location of stocks to less affected areas. 78 Individual constraints on mobility, such as boundary fences, were few?9
Moreover, two critical rules for temporary occupation of a thirdparty's traveling stock on graziers' private claims evolved in the Australian colonies. First, drovers were required to give an owner 12 hours notice of entry to their property and the flock of sheep had to enter within
48 hours. Second, graziers were expected to let travelling sheep drink at
one waterhole provided the stock had walked the minimum distance of
six miles in the preceding 24 hours. 80 As a result, the response to drought
during the period of grazier occupation was "intermittent transhumant
pastoralism."81 During widespread drought, reducing sheep numbers via
slaughtering could combat supply constraints-further reducing the
costs of scarcity brought about by aridity.
Furthermore, riparian rights provided an advantage over prior
appropriation for wool production because interpretation as to what was
a reasonable use was fluid across time and space. When lack of rainfall
reduced supply, courts could redefine reasonableness in order to limit
77. Id. at 94-95 (defining the pastoral zone as areas that receive less than 20 inches of
rain on average and where the most important industry of the zone is wool production).
78. CoLIN WHITE, MASTERING RisK: ENVIRONMENr, MARKETS, AND PoLITICS IN AusTRALIAN EcONOMIC HISTORY 71 (1992).
79. See, e.g., Butlin, supra note 58, at 72; see also John Pickard, The Transition from
Shepherding to Fencing in Colonial Australia, 18 RuRAL HrsT. 143, 155 (2007).
80. R. W. M. Johnson, Squatters, Drovers, and Property Rights, 62 REv. MKTG. AGRIC.
EcoN. 423, 424 (1994).
81. White, supra note 78, at 71 (quoting G.W. Raby, Aspects of the Impact and Response to Drought in New South Wales 1821-1849 (1980) (unpublished Masters thesis, La
Trobe University)).
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the concentration of losses on one individual. In the absence of a water
market in which users have identical profit functions, riparian rights
have an allocative efficiency not attained by appropriative rights. 82 In
cases where heterogeneous profit functions exist, such as in mining, appropriative rights retain their allocative efficiency.
As has been established, Australia is arid and nineteenth century
pastoralists faced a non-binding mobility constraint. Now, consider asset
investment on the goldfields in NSW and Victoria. Water was a critical
input for mining and was primarily used to wash gold bearing gravel.
Water use often took place at a distance from the water source. In order
to convey the resource to the primary mine site, various ditches and
channels were constructed. In Australia, these were referred to as
'races'. 83 Investment in diversion infrastructure was a non-deployable asset so the mobility constraint was binding. Specifically, the mobility constraint was close or equal to one. As a result, it is expected that private
rights would be used to allocate water on the goldfields-and this did
occur.
In this context, appropriative rights had two advantages over riparian rights: diversion capacity was constructed based on the amount of
water claimed, so seniority guaranteed a return on investment costs and,
in the presence of non-deployable assets, forfeiture for non-use made
prior appropriation superior to riparian rights when applied to mining.
Several commentators identify the importance of these characteristics of
prior appropriation.84 For example, Blackstone stressed that monopoly
rights under prior appropriation should be protected in the presence of
"sunk costs and public goods to be protected."85 Prior appropriation
gives users rights to an exclusive volume of water, reducing competition
for that volume that creates monopoly rents. The doctrine can be interpreted as a rule to ensure an adequate share of the resource to each appropriator in order to create a return on sunk investment costs.86

82. H. Stewart Burness & James P. Quirk, Appropriative Water Rights and the Efficient
Allocation of Resources, 69 AM. EcoN. REv. 25, 26 (1979); H. Stewart Burness & James P.
Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23. J.L. &
EcoN. 111, 121 (1980).

83. Smyth, supra note 11, at 83.
84. See generally Getzler, supra note 15, at 193-267; see also Frank J. Trelease, Policies for
Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 1, 27
(1965); A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle or Rhetoric? 76 N.D. L. REv. 881,
884, 890 (2000).
85. Getzler, supra note 15, at 171.
86. See id. at 162.
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Secure water rights aid the attainment of maximum benefits for
the community by encouraging investment. 87 Investment will ordinarily
be made only if the investor can evaluate the risk of losing capital. Uncertainty with regard to entitlement brought about by a flexible use rule,
like reasonable use, may therefore lower investment in fixed assets. Lost
permanent investment in facilities that cannot be transferred to other
uses can be avoided by giving water rights for a sufficient length of time
to permit the investor to recapture the value of the investment through
amortization. In addition, the expectation of the realization of opportunities is the entrepreneur's most valuable asset. 88 The core idea of prior
appropriation is protection of investment-backed expectations from the
risks of variable water supply years.89
One limitation of private rights established under prior appropriation was that seniority created efficiency losses if junior appropriators,
forced to reduce or cease water use during a shortage, were more productive at the margin. However, junior appropriators, by definition,
claim water at a later date. Assuming they can acquire information as to
how much water at a particular source is unclaimed at the time of entrance, they would construct diversion capacity based on this information. The carrying capacity, and, therefore, the size of their diversions
would be equal to the amount of water available given other appropriators claims. The effects would be to mitigate the risk faced during
shortage because of incentives for later entrants to limit diversion size,
and, therefore, capital investment. This would reduce losses brought
about by idle capacity in times of shortage. The ability to trade rights
under prior appropriation would further act to reduce losses borne by
junior appropriators due to insufficient supply. Theoretically, in the
presence of a market, junior appropriators who value water more highly
than senior appropriators will bargain around the priority allocation system. Junior appropriators would value water more highly if they had
information that their mines had higher marginal productivity, in terms
of payable gold, than senior appropriators.
Compare the application of riparian rights to non-deployable assets with the application of riparian rights to deployable assets. Recall,
slaughtering is a complement to the non-binding mobility constraint
when deployable assets dominate. Therefore, where input supplies are
limited by drought, livestock numbers can be adjusted downward to
combat this shortage. Further, slaughtering provides an alternative
source of income for pastoralists because the meat, tallow, and hides of
87. Trelease, supra note 84, at 25.
88. Id. at 26.
89. Tarlock, supra note 84, at 884.

Summer 2013]

THE EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS

239

sheep provide them with a revenue stream in addition to wool. 90 In this
way, productive capacity is adjusted in line with resource availability, so
the extent of idle capacity and foregone production is decreased. In tum,
this complements the prohibition on trading that exists under the riparian doctrine.
Prior appropriation was superior to riparian rights when applied
to mining because of forfeiture for non-use. Gold mining was subject to
ex ante information asymmetries where productivity of claims was unknown prior to investment of mining effort. In this way, before any effort
was expended, the marginal benefit of water was equal across claims,
and uniform returns from water use prevailed. It was only once effort
was expended that the relative value of any one site compared with another was known. At this point the marginal benefit of water would diverge, so that miners at sites with greater quantities of payable gold
would place a higher value on water. Forfeiture ensured maximum expenditure of effort, including full utilization of inputs to maximize returns across the sector until productivity information could be acquired.
If individuals were permitted to claim but not utilize water, this would
limit the quantity available for other miners thereby reducing aggregate
output and wealth.
In the case of the pastoral sector where productivity information
was known ex ante because output per animal was close to uniform, the
marginal benefit of water remained equal across all users. 91 In this way,
equal sharing rules adopted under riparian rights and the reasonable use
test allowed individuals to maximize profits given water availability,
thereby maximizing returns across the sector. Moreover, because the
pastoral sector was subject to seasonal location changes, the loss of water
rights due to non-use would have undermined expansion because of uncertainty regarding rights to this input. The very nature of grazing circumvented any need for the definition of water rights based on quantity
because animal numbers could be reduced in the face of limited supplies
and substitutes existed. Animals could obtain moisture from feed, so if
water supply was limited, but grass was not, part of the moisture requirements of flocks could be obtained by increasing grass consumption.
90. Fluctuations in wool prices also provide an incentive for slaughtering to capture
this alternative revenue stream. For example, pastoralists in NSW and Victoria undertook
extensive slaughtering for meat and tallow when wool prices dropped dramatically during
the depression of the early 1840s. K. L. Fry, Boiling down in the 1840s: A Grimy Means to a
Solvent End, 25 LABOR HIST. (Nov. 1973).
91. Output may have been uniform but prices varied based on the quality of wool
from each flock. At shearing, wool classers would grade each individual sheep output as a
certain level of quality, the wool would then be sold at auction under this quality grade.
The higher the grade of wool, the higher the price received.
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Gold mining lacked substitutes for water so the absence of a forfeiture
rule would reduce output across the sector as new entrants would be
unable to secure supplies to work their mines. Forfeiture ensured optimal investment of effort by all miners, maximizing returns across the
sector. In the absence of such a rule not only would investment in effort
fall, thereby reducing overall productivity, but inefficiencies would be
created through potential monopoly pricing. First possession will be chosen over other allocation methods when important resources are yet to
be discovered. 92 The evolution of prior appropriation on the gold fields
in the U.S. and Australia but not in Australian sheep grazing conforms to
this predication.
In addition to these economic incentives for forfeiture for non-use,
social norms, particularly perceptions of fairness, may also have contributed to prior appropriation's adoption on the gold fields. 93 Justice Field,
a pre-eminent California and U.S. Supreme Court judge, noted, "[customs] were so framed as to secure all comers, within practicable limits,
absolute equality of right and privilege in working the mines."94 Forfeiture circumvented the potential for miners to claim quantities they could
not utilize within a certain time period, ensuring equal opportunities for
all entrants to access a key input. This does not suggest that equal sharing was the rule under the U.S. appropriation doctrine; it is simply illustrating that if an individual claimed more water than could be
productively employed within a certain time frame, forfeiture would
make the surplus supplies available for another claimant who could put
the water to productive use. Individuals may well have claimed different
volumes of water, but these volumes had to be fully utilized. The beneficial use criteria that developed over time in the U.S. created a second
method by which to prevent claimants from under-utilizing a scarce resource. In Australia, equality of opportunity in access to water was incorporated into legislation that restricted volumes claimed under
appropriation. For instance, Victorian regulations limited water right
claims to three box sluice-heads.95 Volume restrictions were used in addi92. Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and Design of Law, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 393, 410
(1995).
93. Schorr, supra note 9, at 69.
94. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 US 453, 457 (1878); McCurdy, supra note 2, at 239, 266 (describing Justice Field's election to the California Supreme Court in 1857, his role as Chief Justice
of that court from 1859 to 1863 and his commission to the United States Supreme Court in
1863).
95. A sluice-head was a box fixed at the head of a water race (channel) to gauge or
measure the quantity of water diverting from a river or stream. Miners were permitted to
divert the number of sluice-heads provided under regulation or gold mining district bylaws. See Smyth, supra note 11, 622).
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tion to forfeiture rules. 96 This supports the view that equality of right
existed under some forms of appropriation-particularly those adopted
in Colorado. 97 Moreover, volume restrictions and forfeiture rules reduced the racing incentive that existed under prior appropriation. 98 As a
result, productivity was more likely to be maximized across the gold
mining sector.
3. The Affect of Legislation on Asset Investment

Changes in land allocation policies in both NSW and Victoria initiated a sequence of events that would alter the nature of water rights for
pastoralists over a period of approximately twenty years. The reallocation of land away from pastoralists toward more permanent forms of
agriculture led asset investment to shift from deployable (sheep) to nondeployable (crops). In light of this change, the framework would predict
that this alteration would be accompanied by a shift toward appropriative water rights. This is what occurred in Australia between 1860 and
1885.
By the end of the 1860s, the supply of alluvial gold in both NSW
and Victoria fell given the technology and capital input required for
smaller miners to locate sub-surface supplies. As a result, unemployment
increased because of the lack of employment opportunities in the underdeveloped industrial sectors. Miners then began to demand changes to
land legislation to allow them access to agricultural land monopolized
by pastoralists. 99 Land reform legislation was passed in both colonies in
the early 1860s, allowing individuals to select land up to a maximum of
320 acres anywhere in the colony. Generally, land reform was considered
a failure in both NSW and Victoria because pastoralists evaded redistribution by employing three tactics: dummying, peacocking, and forcing
an auction.
96. In Victoria, local Mining Courts which were constituted under An Act to amend the
Laws relating to the Gold Fields 1855, 18 Viet. No. 37, determined the period of non-use required for forfeiture. Further, several districts' regulations did not require immediate forfeiture for non-use but instead instituted monetary penalties for miners not using their
water rights. In these districts the uniform claim requirements may have reduced the necessity for absolute forfeiture. This would be more likely in districts with smaller mining
populations where competition for water was not as great as at larger fields. See Smyth,
supra note 11, 572-595).
97. Cf. Schorr, supra note 9, at 11-20 (discussing the role of equality in the development of the Colorado doctrine).
98. See Milliman, supra note 6, at 47-51; see also Burness & Quirk 1979, supra note 82, at
25-26.
99. Alston, Harris & Mueller, supra note 30, at 754 (describing how the extension of
franchise in the mid-1850s meant miners' demands for land policy reform led to a more
rapid political response).
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"Dummying," involved pastoralists contracting with agents, often
employees, to select part of their property, register the claim with the
Department of Lands (often under false names), and then sell it back to
the pastoralist for a small fee. Legislation made this possible because, up
until 1880, a farmer could transfer their claim after only one year of residence. Pastoralists' wealth advantage over smaller farmers permitted
them to undertake this practice on a large scale, increasing the likelihood
that they retained large portions of their original holdings. Data pertaining to the number of selections transferred in NSW from 1862 to 1882
shows close to 60 percent of original claimants sold their land. 100 In itself,
this does not suggest that all these transfers were from dummies to pastoralists; some transfers could have been the result of arid conditions that
caused agriculture to fail. Moreover, the blocks of land allocated under
reform legislation were far too small for these settlers to graze sheep,
suggesting the arid climate may have led to farmlands being transferred.
"Peacocking" was another method by which pastoralists avoided
redistribution of their estates. Peacocking was a practice used primarily
by dummy farmers who would pick the vantage points out of a pastoralist's property so as to render the intervening land useless. 101 The information advantage held by pastoralists and their employees as to land
quality assisted them in this practice.
Forcing an auction was the final means by which pastoralists
could avoid redistribution of their holdings. In this case, wool producers
would either select the same area as a bona fide farmer or would employ
agents to select multiple parcels and then forfeit the claims. 102 Between
1862 and 1882 in NSW, on average, 12 percent of land selected by farm-

100. For anecdotal evidence on the extent of dummying, see generally SELECT CoMMITTEE
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAND LAWS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 2ND PROGRESS REPORT, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, 1872/3 (N.S.W.); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAND LAWS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 3RD PROGRESS REPORT, LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY, VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, 1873/4 (N.S.W.); BoARD OF INQUIRY INTO PROCEEDINGS
IN RELATION To CERTAIN LAND SELECTION IN THE WTMMERA DISTRICT, LEGISLATIVE AssEMBLY,
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, 1873 (Viet.); CROWN LAND DEPARTMENT BOARD OF INQUIRY, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, VoTES AND PROCEEDINGS, 1874 (Viet.).
101. STEPHEN H. ROBERTS, HISTORY OF AuSTRALIAN LAND SETTLEMENT 1788-1920, 240
(1968).
102. The inaccuracy of many district maps created information asymmetries with regard to what land had been the subject of a previous claim under either selection or pastoral pre-emption and lease rights leading to multiple claimants. In cases where two
different parties claimed the same parcel of land, legislation required the plot to be auctioned. Pastoralists were far wealthier than competing selectors and therefore, could easily
outbid other claimants at auction. See Alston, Harris & Mueller, supra note 38, at 24-27.
(explaining how the inaccuracy of many district maps created information asymmetries).
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ers was forfeited. 103 However, this may have included farmers who forfeited their holdings because climatic and economic conditions were not
suited to permanent agriculture.
Forfeiture was also less prominent than dummying. Nevertheless,
forfeiture allowed pastoralists to evade redistribution to some extent because, at auction, capital-constrained farmers were unable to outbid pastoralists.104 All three evasion methods resulted in limited reallocation of
land under the 1860s reform legislation. For instance, by the middle of
the 1880s on average, only 27 percent of farmers remained on the land. 105
Thus, land reform had resulted in "[u]nintelligible chaos, in which the
rights and interest of all mainly concerned have been the sport of accident, political interest, and departmental disorder." 106
In NSW land reform failure was far more pronounced than in Victoria, in part because the former had a relatively smaller mining population than the latter. 107 In turn, the continued dominance of the pastoral
industry with its non-binding mobility constraint led to a persistence of
riparian water rights in that sector. Figure 1 (below) illustrates the importance of pastoral sector contribution to NSW GDP from the mid-1860s
to 1910. The figure shows that even after land reform the pastoral sector
continued to outstrip agriculture in terms of GDP contribution, and during this period riparian rights remained dominant. As the agricultural
sectors contribution to GDP began to increase, post-1902 irrigation became a more prominent farming method. 108
In turn, there was a growth in non-deployable asset investment.
The new framework proposed in this article predicts that once irrigation
expands, water rights will evolve toward private rights. Outcomes in
NSW conform to this prediction with the Irrigation Act abolishing riparian rights in 1912. This legislation replaced riparian rights with state
ownership. In turn, state agencies allocated water use rights to individuals with a guarantee that these rights would be available in most "ordinary" rainfall years. As a result, in line with the predictive framework,

103. AUGUSTUS MORRIS & GEORGE RANKEN, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF
PUBLIC LANDS AND THE OPERATION OF THE LAND LAWS (1883).
104. See generally Alston, Harris & Mueller, supra note 38, at 27 (providing a more detailed discussion on evasion methods used by pastoralists to avoid redistribution).
105. MoRRIS & RANKEN, supra note 103, at 15.
106. Id.
107. Cf J. C. Caldwell, Population, in AusTRALIANS HISTORICAL STATISTICS 26, 27 (Wray
Vamplew ed., 1987) (colonial population data).
108. In part, this was the result of the 1902 drought that caused widespread crop losses
across the state and Figure 2 reflects these losses showing a consistent fall of the agricultural sector's contribution to GDP post 1902 which only began to recover in 1906/07.
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once non-deployable asset investment increased, water rights evolved toward private rights. 109
Due to the relative increase in farming population under 1860s
land reform, Victoria experienced a growth in irrigation earlier than
NSW. This was accompanied by a move from riparian to appropriative
rights three decades before NSW. Private investment and experimentation in irrigation expanded from the late 1870s onward. Figure 2 (below)
shows the increasing value of the agricultural sector compared with pastoral sector from the late 1870s onward, when growth in the former was
underpinned by an expansion in irrigation. As has been established, irrigation requires investment in non-deployable assets so that the development of this farming method creates a binding mobility constraint.
Paralleling this, the framework in section three predicts there should be a
move toward private water rights; this did occur in Victoria. 110 Riparian
rights in that colony were abolished in 1882 under the Water Conservation Act. Moreover, like NSW, albeit at an earlier juncture, government
ministries became responsible for allocating water to individual users. In
other words, as predicted, water rights evolved toward private rights
once investment in non-deployable assets created a binding mobility
constraint. The next section illustrates the outcomes of water rights
evolution in the U.S. As will be demonstrated, the empirical outcomes
conform to the predictive framework in section three, where aridity combined with non-deployable assets led to private rights being adopted
(California and Colorado).

109. The other major sectors of the colonial economy of both NSW and Victoria were
manufacturing and construction. Manufacturing was concentrated on ports in urban areas
and focused on the processing of raw materials as well as making building materials.
Water use in these industries was regulated under legislation that only applied to urban
areas and was similar to the New South Wales Water Act 1912 and An Act to provide for the
conservation and distribution of water throughout Victoria 1881, 45 Viet. No. 716. Riparian
rights were abolished, and state authorities allocated water to users: the Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewerage Board in Sydney, NSW, and the Melboume Metropolitan
Board of Works in Melbourne, Victoria. The historical evolution of water rights in these
two colonies shows a clear demarcation of urban and rural supply with water rights in
urban areas moving to private rights more quickly than in rural areas. In part, this was
because of the need to provide domestic supplies and sanitation in the rapidly growing
cities. Further, this evolution conforms to the predictive framework because binding mobility constraints in manufacturing and domestic supply led to private water rights being
adopted.
110. Edwyna Harris, Colonialism and Long-run Growth in Australia: An Examination of
Institutional Change in Victoria's Water Sector During the Nineteenth Century, 48 AusTL. EcoN.
HlST. REV.

266, 275 (2008).
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B. Climate and Asset Investment Framework Applied in California
and Colorado

As noted, there are two distinct regimes applied across the arid
western states of the U.S.: the hybrid system known as the California
doctrine; and 'pure' prior appropriation, known as the Colorado doctrine. For simplification, the analysis presented will focus on the two
states where these doctrines originated: California and Colorado. However, where appropriate, examples from other states that adopted these
doctrines will be used to highlight the durability of the framework's predictive capacity.
Before applying the predictive framework, the type of climate and
asset investment undertaken needs to be established. All states that
adopted either of these approaches lie west of the 100th parallel and are
arid, receiving between eight and 12 inches of rainfall per annum. 111 During the nineteenth century, several sectors utilized water: gold mining,
irrigation, and cattle grazing. Since climate in both regions is arid, the
framework proposed in this article predicts appropriative rights will
evolve in the gold mining and irrigation sectors while riparian rights will
be applied in cattle grazing. Empirical evidence from both cases supports
these predicted outcomes.

1. The California Doctrine in California
The California doctrine meant irrigators and cattle graziers in California could assert water rights based on either appropriation or riparian rights. 112 Given that California is arid and the dominant forms of
water use in mining and irrigation were accompanied by non-deployable
asset investment, the proposed framework predicts the adoption of appropriative rights. During the 1880s, as irrigated agriculture expanded,
the presence of aridity combined with non-deployable asset investment
should have accelerated a move away from riparian rights to appropriative rights. For the predicted shift to prior appropriation legislation, the
Civil Code or an independent act of parliament could have effected the
change. This did not occur. Although the framework proposed in this
article predicts a complete shift to prior appropriation, a breakdown of
the history of water rights in California shows an evolution towards
more private prior appropriation rights. This validates the framework
proposed in this article.
111. Cf Libecap, supra note 2, at 283.
112. See generally Duckworth v. Watsonville Water and Light Co., 150 Cal. 520,89 P. 338
(1907) (holding that while appropriators could claim a right to waters not otherwise
claimed by another party's riparian right, they could not supersede them).
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California courts did apply prior appropriation rules that overcame potential rigidities imposed by riparian rights. In this case, it was
used to determine conflicts between riparian users. Specifically, it allocated rights to the flow of services from the asset (water) to a defined
group of users-those that owned or occupied riparian lands. In tum,
the appropriation test created individual rights to the amount initially
utilized. Subsequent uses were conditional on the availability of these
volumes without interference. As a result, individual group members
that had access to the resource stock did not have equal right to the flow
of services from the assets.
This can be compared with the reasonable use test that made individual use conditional on the equal rights held by other users. Each right
holder had an obligation not to interfere with other group members'
rights to utilize water. In tum, a later arrival could prevent extant users
from continuing certain activities if they negatively affected his ability to
make use of the water, either by reducing quality or quantity. 113 Theresult was that individuals had equal right to the flow of services from the
asset. Reasonable use therefore created a greater degree of commonality
between users than did the appropriative test. Importantly, the test
courts applied to determine water conflicts defined the degree to which
individual rights to the resource were private compared with correlative
(held in common). At the aggregate level, property rights may reflect
common property characteristics. However, at the individual level,
rights may resemble private rights. If the appropriation test is applied to
all users, not just a small group-for example, those with riparian
rights-then this will create rights that are akin to private rights rather
than correlative. Evidence from the California Supreme Court shows it
consistently applied the appropriation test in water disputes.
Prior to the late 1870s few water disputes came before the court,
but in those that did the courts generally supported the first in time,
regardless of whether the first in time asserted claims based on riparian
or appropriative rights. 114 However, by 1886, in the famous Lux v. Haggin/15 the court upheld riparian rights. This signaled an intention to up-

113. At common law this was subject to previous users not having redress to claim
prescriptive rights. Prescription allowed individuals to assert uninterrupted occupation
and use of a resource for 20 years implied a title had been granted, but had subsequently
been lost. For example, if A had continuously diverted 50 per cent of a stream flow for 20
years and B took no action against this use, under common law A would have prescriptive
rights to continue her use even if at some later date B objected.
114. See generally Freyfogle, supra note 6, at 501-504.
115. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1886).
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hold the doctrine in spite of California's arid climateY6 Previous studies
have ignored one important aspect of this case-Lux's water use predated Haggin's. The outcome, therefore, is more consistent with the
court's previous approach. Moreover, at no point did the court rule Haggin was not to use the water source in question. The court simply found
that if he interfered with the extant users prior rights, he would infringe
on their legal rights to a defined volume. This was the very basis of the
appropriation test.
Subsequent California Supreme Court rulings from 1890 to 1910
continued to apply the appropriation test regardless of whether a plaintiff asserted rights under the riparian doctrine or prior appropriation.
During this period, 24 water disputes came before the court. Of these, the
court adhered to the appropriation test in 20 (refer to Appendix 2 for a
list of cases). In al120, while either the plaintiffs or defendants may have
owned or occupied land by which they acquired riparian rights, the
court found for the prior user. For example, in Wutchum Water Co. v.
Pogue the court stated: "as to the plaintiff's title to the water, it is indisputable that [his diversion ditch] was constructed ... prior to the time that
Progue acquired any of his rights either as an owner of riparian lands or
an appropriator."117 In Huffner v. Sawday the court found: "the plaintiffs,
whether as riparian proprietors or as prior appropriators of all the waters ordinarily flowing in the stream, had a right superior to that of the
defendants ..."118
Furthermore, the court adopted another aspect of the appropriation test: limiting a riparian's rights to the volume that could be beneficially utilised. 119 The court also acted to limit application of the riparian
doctrine via two methods. It permitted diversions of water not being utilized by riparians120 while also narrowing the circumstances by which
116. See generally M. Catherine Miller, Riparian Rights and the Control of Water in California, 1879-1928: The Relationship Between an Agricultural Enterprise and Legal Change, 58
AGRIC. HisT. 1 (1985); See generally Freyfogle, supra note 6; See generally Kanazawa, supra
note 2; See generally Pisani, supra note 2. In this case, Lux was attempting to secure an

injunction by asserting riparian rights to prevent Haggin from diverting water for irrigation that had significant impacts on flow, particularly during drought years. Lux was a
grazing company known as Miller and Lux. Catherine Miller notes the Miller-Lux Company formed a riparian rights association with a group of cattlemen in order to prevent
'threatened interference' from upstream canal companies. The association's immediate
goal was to stop Haggin from diverting water that the cattlemen felt had exacerbated the
effects of the severe 1877 drought on their lands.
117. Wutchum Water Co. v. Pogue, 151 Cal. 105, 111, 90 P. 362, 363 (1907).
118. Huffner v. Sawday, 153 Cal. 86, 94, 94 P. 424, 427 (1908).
119. Senior v. Anderson, 130 Cal. 290, 296-97, 62 P. 563, 566 (1900).
120. Modoc Land and Livestock Co. v Booth, 102 Cal. 151, 156-57, 36 P. 431, 432-33
(1894); Fifield v Spring Val. Waterworks, 130 Cal. 552, 554-55, 62 P. 1054, 1055 (1900).
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individuals could obtain riparian rights. In San Joaquin v. Fresno Flume,
the court reaffirmed its opinion that: "It seems clear that in no case
should a riparian owner be permitted to demand, as of right, the intervention of a court of equity to restrain all persons who are not riparian
owners from diverting any water from the stream at points above him
121
••• "
Narrowing the conditions by which individuals could claim riparian rights was attained, in part, by preventing acquisition of rights on
once contiguous blocks for which the government had issued separate
titles. 122 Combined, these circumstances show the Californian common
law tended to evolve toward private water rights, conforming to the expected evolutionary pattern outlined in section three.
This shift occurred as irrigation and corollary investment in nondeployable assets expanded, while deployable asset investment fell. Using oat production as a proxy for irrigation expansion, Figure 3 shows
growth in acres harvested of oats from the 1890s, while the number of
cattle in the state was falling. 123 Combined with the evidence from the
state Supreme Court, the progression of water rights conforms to the
predictions outlined in section three: that in the presence of aridity and
non-deployable asset investment, private rights will evolve.
C. Climate and Asset Investment in Colorado

In Colorado, water rights evolved to create exclusive reliance on
prior appropriation. Like California, water used in Colorado from the
mid to late-1800s was for mining, irrigation, and livestock. Mining codes
from the late 1850s supported prior appropriation. 124 Early irrigators also
applied this doctrine. Consequently, in 1860, the first legislature enshrined appropriation rules in irrigation laws. 125 In 1876, the Colorado
constitution exclusively incorporated appropriation as the rule for water
allocation in the state, with no mention of riparian rights. Subsequently,
the Colorado Supreme Court applied prior appropriation in the key case

121. San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & I. Co. v. Fresno F. & I. Co., 158 Cal. 626, 629,
112 P. 182, 183-84 (1910).
122. Boehmer v. Big Rock Creek Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 26-27, 48 P. 908, 910 (1897).
123. See infra Figure 3. Although oats are not a perfect proxy given many early irrigators produced alfalfa, statistics for which are not available, it does serve to illustrate the
main point.
124. Gold was discovered in Colorado in May 1859. By June of that year there were
5,000 people at the Gregory diggings (named after the first discoverer), northwest of Denver. Schorr, supra note 9, at 12. Given the migration of many "forty-niners" from California
to Colorado, application of prior appropriation in the latter state's mining districts is not
surprising. See Dunbar, supra note 2, at 120-21.
125. Cf Dunbar, supra note 2, at 121.
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of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company. 126 The case involved conflict between two groups of irrigators. Justice Helm rejected out of hand the
plaintiff's assertion that their riparian rights had been infringed upon by
upstream irrigators and declared the riparian doctrine had never existed
in Colorado. 127 The framework proposed in this article predicts that in
arid states where water use requires investment in non-deployable assets
(mining and irrigation), private rights will evolve.
However, prior appropriation was also applied to the cattle industry in Colorado, which gained prominence from the late 1870s. Once this
industry is incorporated into the analysis, the framework appears to lose
its predictive power. Because cattle are deployable and Colorado is arid,
it is expected that riparian rights would be utilized in this sector; but this
did not occur. This apparent deviation from the expected outcome can be
explained by taking into account one important characteristic of the Colorado cattle industry during the 1870s and 1880s: the industry faced a
binding mobility constraint.
The formation of Cattleman's Associations in response to market
demands strictly limited the mobility of livestock. During the nineteenth
century, most land in Colorado remained in the hands of the Federal
government and was therefore public land.l28 Cattle graziers occupied
vast tracts of this land underpinned by first possession principles. In the
early years of this occupation, limited competition meant graziers had to
invest little in definition and enforcement of their land and water rights.
However, as cattle prices increased and railroad infrastructure was extended, bringing frontier land closer to markets, competition rose. As
scarcity increased, so too did the returns from investment in definition
and enforcement of property rights. In turn, because of the absence of
low cost fencing technology, such as barbed wire, graziers established
commons arrangements via Cattlemen's Associations. Cattlemen's Associations protected members' rights to use land and water available on
the common range, preventing encroachment and over-grazing that
would have resulted if open access conditions had been retained. 129 Once
126. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47 (1882).
127. Id. at 446.
128. A proportion of public land had been transferred to private ownership. See Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862); see also Timber Culture Act, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873;
Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877); Timber and Stone Act, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89
(1878).
129. Aside from the economic incentive for cattlemen to avoid overuse of the commons,

two other factors encouraged cooperation by associ11tions: the need to enforce individual
ownership of cattle and the need for a roundup. Ownership to individual cattle was
achieved via the use of brands registered with associations, and later under state law.
Roundup activities faced economies of scale problems, increasing incentives for collective
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a range was considered fully stocked, the association would advertise
that it was closed. After closure was advertised, it was impossible for
new entrants to use the range or participate in the bi-annual roundup,
unless they bought range rights from an existing association member.
Range rights were acquired by buying cattle on their usual range. With
cattle came good will and the privilege of using the range for grazing. 130
Range closure imposed both land and water constraints on association members. The constraints on water inputs transformed cattle into
non-deployable assets, creating a binding mobility constraint. Because a
majority of ranges were subject to claims by different associations, cattle
owners were unable to move their livestock to water located outside the
boundaries of their associations' range. On each range, water sources
were limited to the rivers or streams that flowed through the common
pasture. If individual graziers could move their herds, each association
had the same incentive to prevent new comers by advertising range closure. As a result, there would have been very few, if any, opportunities
to make use of cattle mobility.
One way cattlemen may have overcome this constraint was to
hold rights on several ranges simultaneously. Evidence of branding registration suggests this may have been done.131 Nevertheless, it may not
have been a frequent practice given the cost of acquiring range rights,
which has been estimated, exclusive of cattle and land, at approximately
$200,000 (USD). 132 Further, in order to move cattle and utilize multiple
range rights to counter water shortages, an owner would have to
roundup their cattle that were intermingled with others on one range in
order to move them to another location.
Roundups did not enhance mobility as one would think. There
were two main drawbacks for individual roundups. The activity was labor intensive, making it costly for an individual compared with a group
so that there were economies of scale in having one roundup rather than

action to establish rules and administration of the bi-annual activity. Only members of each
Cattlemen's Association could participate in the roundup on a given range. This created
another method by which exclusion from the range could be accomplished. These economic incentives for cooperation and creation of informal rules of use in the absence of
formal law led to Cattlemen's Associations being the main form of organization for graziers in many Western states during the nineteenth century. See generally Osgood, supra
note 43; Dennen, supra note 43, at 424; Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and
Contracts, 31 J. L. Studies 5489, S500 (2002); TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NoT
5o WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER (2004).
130. See generally Valerie Weeks Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effects on Western
Land Law, 28 MoNT. L. R. 155, 182 (1967).
131. Cf. Osgood, supra note 43, at 135-39.
132. Dennen, supra note 43, at 434.
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several. In addition, a roundup was stressful on cattle. 133 Individual
roundups also had costs for the collective because they created the potential for stealing, and this increased monitoring costs. As a result, the
incentives facing individuals and associations would have discouraged
movement from range to range even in the face of water shortages. In
turn, cattle in Colorado were transformed from deployable to nondeployable assets because of the Cattleman's Associations.
This was a different outcome compared to the Australian pastoral
sector. 134 Australia adopted riparian rights, the opposite of the Colorado
doctrine, even though the climate was similar; this had to do with the
fact that the assets in Australia were deployable, unlike the Colorado
cattle, which were limited by the Cattleman's Associations. Two factors
reduced the Australian need for associations of the type used in Colorado's cattle grazing sector so that sheep retained full mobility. First, private occupancy rights to land occupied by pastoralists were granted via
a license system established in the 1830s. Second, sheep did not have to
be cooperatively rounded up because on the open range shepherds controlled them. 135
Under the license system, pastoralists could occupy as much land
as they wanted for £10 per annum. They scattered land claims over a
wide geographical area to combat water supply extremes and seasonal
patterns of feed availability. Private land rights reduced the likelihood
that flocks would intermingle, thereby reducing the costs of enforcing
ownership to stock; legislation also required registration of sheep
brands. Consequently, licenses were an effective defense of individual
rights against all parties but the Crown. 136 Further, norms evolved torestrict the number of sheep to 520 per shepherd to maximize returns from

133. Alston, Harris & Mueller, supra note 38, at 30.
134. On and around gold fields certain locations were designated for local residents to
graze sheep, horses, and cattle. These pastures were subject to commons rules devised by
local committees and approved by the Governor in Council. The rules established had all
the features of common property including: limits on who could utilize the commons; restrictions on the number of animals an individual was permitted to graze; charges for using
the commons; the use of registered brands to identify animals permitted to graze (and
therefore, any trespassing animals); and appointment of herders to protect stock. See generally J. J. Casey, Regulations for a Common, VICTORIA GovERNMENT GAZETTE, August 28, 1874,
at 1592 (example of regulations establishing the aforementioned arrangement); see also J. F.
Levien, Regulations for a Common, VICTORIA GovERNMENT GAZETTE, August 28, 1885, at 2484.
Outside these areas occupational licenses conferred private rights to land.
135. Anderson & Hill, supra note 129, at S505.
136. Shepherds prevented encroachment by other individuals or m.tural predators (for
instance, native dogs) reducing costs of enforcing ownership.
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their efforts. 137 Combined, the nature of the sheep grazing and land settlement policies acted to maximize the inherent benefits brought about
by livestock mobility. As a result, in Australia sheep producers faced a
non-binding mobility constraint, while in Colorado the need for cattlemen to cooperate created a binding constraint.
Prior appropriation remained in Colorado despite the decline of
the mobility constrained cattle industry because irrigation grew at the
same time. Figure 4 (below) illustrates the importance of the cattle grazing industry in Colorado from the mid-nineteenth century until about
1908/09. In order to make the figure comparable to Figure 3 (above), oat
production has been included as a proxy for irrigation expansion. The
dominance of the cattle industry serves to indicate why Colorado legislators adopted the "pure" appropriation doctrine early in the state's history. Moreover, with the growth of irrigation output after the first
decade of the twentieth century, the continued application of prior appropriation conforms to the predicted outcomes in the framework proposed by this article.
In the absence of cattle grazing, adoption of the Colorado doctrine
in states such as Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah was the result of nondeployable assets investments in irrigation and/ or gold mining. In Arizona and New Mexico, for example, appropriation has its origin in Mexican irrigation custom (and Spanish law). 138 In Utah, early Mormon
settlers diverted water for irrigation that recognized prior use as the basis for allocations.139 The framework developed here predicts this outcome in the states that bypassed common rights entirely, since irrigation
was dominated by non-deployable asset investment.
D. The Eastern U.S. and England

Eastern U.S. states and England refined the riparian doctrine by
including prior appropriation principles of reasonable use in their water
rights. This trend towards reasonable use does not alter the validity of
137. This norm was the result of three factors. First, areas in which sheep first grazed in
NSW were scrubby, creating the potential for large losses due to the inability for one shepherd to manage a flock larger than 520. See EDWARD M. CURR, REcoLLECTIONS OF SQUATTING
IN VICTORIA, THEN CALLED THE PoRT PHILLIP DISTRICT (FROM 1841 TO 1851) 38 (1883). This
norm was adopted in Victoria even though sheep grazed on flat pastures. Second, if flocks
numbered over 520 it was believed that pastures over which flock travelled would be
wasted and stronger sheep would consume the bulk of the grass. Alston, Harris & Mueller,
supra note 38, at 12. Third early shepherds were convicts and they had little incentives to
prevent sheep losses.
138. 3 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 163,
386 (1977).
139. Id. at 536-38
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the framework in this article because riparian rights remained entrenched despite some minor tweaking. This section will explain the riparian theories in the eastern U.S. and England, and will also explain
that riparian rights were modified not because of climate or asset development, but rather because the courts needed a more flexible approach
to resolving disputes due to their heavy case load.
The eastern U.S. and England developed riparian rights because
they were not arid, and water use was dominated by the textiles industry
that relied on hydropower to drive cotton spindles. Mills are nondeployable assets. Mills included the construction of weirs, dams, river
widening, sluices, bridges, and mill channels. 140 Furthermore, in both the
eastern U.S. and England, as mills developed, water conflicts were intragroup-specifically between mill owners. As a result, the framework
proposed in this article would predict that because these areas were not
arid with investment in non-deployable assets, riparian rights would
evolve-and this did occur despite some differences in interpretation as
explained below.
Courts in the eastern U.S. and England applied the reasonable use
test to determine intra-group riparian conflicts that established the degree to which individual rights to the resource were common compared
with private. Reasonable use established equal sharing rules between riparian owners thereby creating a greater degree of commonality between riparians than alternative tests, such as the appropriation test.
Once courts in England and eastern U.S. jurisdictions adopted reasonable use, they created a more precise set of common property rights to
water dictating that each member of the group was equal in both right
and obligation. However, the degree to which interference would be tolerated differed in each setting so that English courts appear to have
adopted a more narrow interpretation of what would be considered reasonable compared with eastern U.S. jurisdictions.
The basis for the reasonable use test was founded in the U.S. Federal Court case Tyler v. Wilkinson. 141 In this case Justice Story dearly laid
out the test as it would be applied in the U.S. stating:
When I speak of this common right, I do not mean to be understood, as holding the doctrine, that there can be no diminution whatsoever, and no obstruction whatsoever, by a riparian
proprietor, in the use of the water as it flows; for that would be
to deny any valuable use of it. There. . .must be allowed of
that, which is common to all, a reasonable use. The true test of
the principle and extent of the use is, whether it is to the injury
140. See generally, Getzler, supra note 15, at 22-27.
141. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397, 24 F.Cas 472 (1827).
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of other proprietors or not. There may be a diminution in
quantity, or a retardation or acceleration of the natural current
indispensable for the general and valuable use of the water,
perfectly consistent with the existence of the common right.
The diminution, retardation, or acceleration, not positively
and sensibly injurious by diminishing the value of the common, is an implied element in the right of using the stream at
all. The law here ...acts with a reasonable reference to public
convenience and general good, and it is not betrayed into a
narrow strictness, subversive of common sense, not into an extravagant looseness, which would destroy private rights. 142
This was a far more liberal version of what would be considered reasonable than was adopted in England in Embrey v. Owen. 143 In this case,
Parke B, citing U.S. precedent noted:
In America ...a very liberal use of the stream for the purposes
of irrigation.. .is permitted...in England it is not clear that [a]
user to that extent...would be in every case deemed a lawful
enjoyment of the water, if it was again returned to the river
with no other diminution than that which was caused by absorption and evaporation attendant on the irrigation of lands
of the adjoining proprietor. This must depend upon the circumstances of each case. On the one hand, it could not be permitted that the owner of a tract of many thousands acres of
porous soil, abutting on part of the stream, could be permitted
to irrigate them continually by canals and drains, and so cause
a serious diminution of the quantity of water, though there
were no other loss to the natural stream than that arising from
the necessary absorption and evaporation of the water employed for that purpose; on the other hand, one's common
sense would be shocked by supposing that a riparian owner
could not dip a watering-pot into the stream, in order to water
his garden, or allow his family, or his cattle to drink it. It is
entirely a question of degree ...144
The predictive framework in this article is not constructed to explain the nature of the tests applied under either riparian or appropriative rights. These tests or 'rules of thumb' evolved to determine disputes
between users that acquired rights under either riparian, appropriative, or
the hybrid doctrine adopted in each location. In England, the reasonable
use test was adopted because it provided flexibility in the court's ap-

142. Id. at 472.
143. See generally Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851).
144. Id. at 371-72.
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proach to resolving water disputes that could be adapted given the specific context in which these conflicts took place. At the time, this
flexibility in English common law was crucial because of
industrialization.
During nineteenth century industrialization, the costs of administering justice based on reliance on detailed factual pleadings became prohibitively high. The use of appropriative tests to determine riparian
disputes was extremely fact sensitive, increasing the costs to judges because of parallel efforts to reduce the discretion of juries. In consequence,
there was a greater drain on judges' time by relying on factual pleadings
at a time when the judicial system faced increasing conflicts. This
prompted a simplification of common law intention-based concepts that
emphasized the objectivity of user rights exemplified by tests such as
'reasonableness' of uses. Reasonable use allowed courts to adjust their
findings given the circumstances of a dispute. Circumstances influenced
by norms and repeat transactions established a pattern of expected behavior from users of the common pool. As a norm enforcer, the common
law used the reasonable test, founded on the party's own conduct, to
restrain destructive competition of the common pool resource. In tum,
the common law paid careful attention to agreements, understandings,
and the practices of parties using the water resource-something that
would vary over time and space.
V. CONCLUSION

The empirical examples presented in this paper conform to the
expected outcomes given the alternative combinations of climate and asset type as outlined in Table 1. Specifically, five cases have been identified in which three of the cells have been explained. Appropriative rights
evolved in an arid climate with non-deployable asset investment, as illustrated in the cases of California and Colorado gold mining and irrigation and the Australian gold mining sector. Riparian rights evolved in a
climate that was not arid with non-deployable asset investment, as
shown in the case of the eastern U.S. and England. As expected, riparian
rights also arose where an arid climate was combined with deployable
asset investment, as demonstrated in the Australian pastoral sector.
Property rights will evolve from open access to private rights as
scarcity increases. Water scarcity is affected by two main factors: climate
and investment type. These two variables will determine where and
when riparian or appropriative rights are expected to evolve. By combining these two variables, the framework developed here leads to four expected outcomes that have been confirmed by the empirical evidence
presented in this paper. First, in arid climates where non-deployable assets dominate, scarcity is high and appropriative rights will be adopted.
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This prediction is supported by evidence from nineteenth century California gold mining and irrigation, Colorado gold mining and cattle grazing, and Australia gold mining. Second, in arid climates where
deployable investments dominate, scarcity brought about by lack of rainfall will be counteracted by a non-binding mobility constraint so that riparian rights will evolve. Outcomes in the Australian pastoral sector
provide evidence that conforms to this prediction. Third, in climates that
are not arid where investment in non-deployable assets dominates, scarcity will be low and riparian rights will evolve. This prediction is supported by evidence from the eastern U.S. and England. Finally, in
climates that are not arid where investment in deployable assets dominates, scarcity will be very low and theoretically it is expected riparian
rights will evolve. There is a lack of empirical evidence to support this
outcome. However, the durability of the framework has been sufficiently
demonstrated so as to sqpport these theoretical expectations. The findings here suggest that asset type combined with climate may be better
able to explain how and why water rights evolve toward riparian or appropriative rights at certain times and in particular locations. Application of the framework to a greater number of empirical examples is
necessary to strengthen the findings presented here.
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1 Framework for water rights evolution
Asset type

Arid

Non-Deployable

Deployable

Appropriative rights

Riparian rights

Not Arid Riparian rights

Riparian rights

2: Rainfall correlation coefficients, NSW and Victoria,
1878-1910145

TABLE

Pair

Correlation
coefficient

Deniliquin-Nyan Gay

0.92

Wentworth-Pooncarrie

-O.Slb

Condobolin-Trundle

0.85

Trundle-Manildra

0.71b

Moama-Conargo

0.65b

Yamba-Casino

0.69.

Albury-Wangaratta

0.85

Rochester-Shepparton

0.87

Kerang-Charleton

0.82

Barraport-Coonooer Bridge

0.91

Wickliffe-Beaufort

0.90

Rochester-Bendigo

0.88

Barraport-Swan Hill

o.1o·

• Stations located in an East-West direction.
Stations with greater distances between them (refer to Appendix 1).

b

145. Data available at: Bureau of Meteorology, Climate Data Online, AusTRALIAN
GovERNMENT, http:/ /www.bom.gov.au/climate/data (last visited March 30, 2013).
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1 Contribution of pastoral sector and agriculture to NSW
GDP 1861 to 1910146

FIGURE
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146. See Brian Haig, New estimates of Australian GDP 1861-1948/49,41 Aus. EcoN. HrsT.

R. 1, 31-32 (2001) (table A3).
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2 Contribution of the pastoral sector and agriculture to
Victorian GDP 1861 to 1910147
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FIGURE

3 California oat production and cattle numbers, 1867 to

1910148
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148. See Nat'! Agric. Stat. Serv., California Oats, 1867-2011, U.S. DEP'T OF AGruc., http:/

I www .nass.usda.gov /Statistics_by_State/ California/Historical_Data/ Oats.pdf (last
visited March 30, 2013); see also Nat'! Agric. Stat. Serv., Cattle and Calves, Inventory by Class,
January 1, 1867-2011, U. S. DEP'T OF AGruc., http:/ /www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_
State/Califomia/Historical_Data/CattleByC!ass.pdf (last visited March 30, 2013).
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4 Colorado oat production and cattle numbers, 1866 to 1910149
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149. Adapted from the US Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics
Service, www.nass.usda.gov [January 8, 2010].
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1 Paired Rainfall Stations 1878 to 1910 150
NEW SOUTH WALES

Station pair

Station numbers

Distance apart (km2)

Deniliquin-Nyan Gay

074074 - 075013

80

Wentworth-Pooncarrie

047045 - 047033

117

Condobolin-Trundle

050014- 050028

64

Trundle-Manildra

050028 - 065022

109

Moama-Conargo

074074 - 075075

109

Yamba-Casino

058012 - 058063

81

VICTORIA

Station pair

Station numbers

Distance apart (km2)

Albury-Wangaratta

072001 - 082053

70

Rochester-Shepparton

080081 - 081044

72

Kerang-Charleton

080023 - 080006

89

Barraport-Coonooer Bridge

077062 - 080009

69

Wickliffe-Beaufort

089033 - 089005

76

Rochester-Bendigo

080081 - 081003

67

Barraport-Swan Hill

077062 - 077042

86

150. Data available at: Bureau of Meteorology, Weather Station Directory, AusTRALIAN
GovERNMENT, http:/ /www.bom.gov.au/climate/data/stations/ (last visited March 30,
2013) (Rainfall station names, numbers, and distance apart are available or can be
calculated).
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2 Water Cases heard by the California Supreme Court
1890 to 1910

APPENDIX

Case Name
Last Chance v Heilbron
Conkling v Pacific Improvement Co.
Riverside Water Co. v Gage
Mott v Ewing et al
Spargur et ux v Heard et al
Modoc Land and Live-Stock Co et al v
Booth et al
Vernon Irrigation Co. v City of Los
Angeles et al
Hargrave et al v Cook et al
Boehmer v Big Rock Creek Irrigation
District et al
San Luis Water Co. v Estrada et al
Gould v Eaton et al
Bathgate et al v Irvine et al
Senior et al v Anderson et al
Fifield v Spring Valley Waterworks
Newport et al v Temescal Water Co.
Anaheim Union W-ater Co. et al v Fuller

et al
Duckworth et al v Watsonville Water
and Light Co. et al
Wutchumna Water Co. v Pogue
Montecito Valley Water Co. v City of
Santa Barbara et al
Cohen v LA Canada Land and Water
Co. et al
Huffner et al v Sawday et al
Miller and Lux v Madera Canal and
Irrigation Co.
Miller v Bay Cities Water Co. et al
San Joaquin and Kings River Canal and
Irrigation Co v Fresno Flume and
Irrigation Co.
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